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Abstract— This paper surveys some of the main ethical issues
pertaining to robotics that have been discussed in the literature.
We start with the idea of responsibility ascription that arises
when an autonomous system malfunctions or harms people.
Next, we discuss various ethical issues emerging in two sets of
robotic applications: service robots that peacefully interact with
humans and lethal robots created to fight in battlefields. Then,
we provide a short overview of machine ethics, a new research
trend that aims at designing and implementing artificial systems
with “morally” acceptable behavior. We then highlight resulting
gaps in legislation, and discuss the need for guidelines to
regulate the creation and deployment of such autonomous
systems. Often, when designing such systems, the benefits tend
to overshadow partly unknown but potentially large negative
consequences.
Key words: Roboethics, Machine Ethics, Human-Robot Inter-
action, Autonomous Systems
I. INTRODUCTION
This decade has undergone a “robotic demographic explo-
sion.” The number of industrial robots in operation exceeded
1 million at the end of 2008. Sales of robots for personal and
domestic purposes have increased rapidly since 2000 and
reached 7.2 million at the end of 2009 [41]. The rampant
growth of service robots has led people to rethink the role of
robots within society. Robots are no longer “slave” machines
that respond only to human requests, but now embody some
degree of autonomy and decision making. Some robots are
even viewed to be “companions” to humans. As a result,
a number of ethical issues have emerged. Thus this paper
provides a survey of the current ethical landscape in robotics.
Our goal is to show what has been done to date, with an
eye toward the future. We believe that a lively and engaged
discussion of ethical issues in robotics by roboticists and
others, is essential for creating a better and more just world.
In this paper, we highlight the possible benefits, as well
potential threats, related to the widespread use of robots.
We follow the view that a robot cannot be analyzed on its
own without taking into consideration the complex socio-
technical nexus of todays’ societies and that high-tech de-
vices such as robots may influence how societies develop
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in ways that could not be foreseen during the design of the
robots. In our survey, we limit ourselves to presenting the
ethical issues delineated by other authors and relay their lines
of reasoning for raising the public’s concerns. We show that
disagreements on what is ethical or not in robotics stems
often from different beliefs on human nature and different
expectations on what technology may achieve in the future.
We stay away from offering a personal stance to these issues,
so as to allow the reader to form her/his opinion.
In terms of robotic applications, we focus on service robots
that peacefully interact with humans (Figures 1.(a) and 1.(b))
and on lethal robots created to fight on battlefields (Figures
1.(c) and 1.(d)). Other robotic applications are also discussed
in the literature and have lead authors to emit a variety
of concerns for our societies. Unfortunately, due to space
constraints, we had to limit ourselves in our presentation. For
instance, we omitted the question of unemployment caused
by the development of industrial robots. This concern is in
line with the general issue of using machines to replace
human labor, a topic that is central to philosophical debates
since the industrial revolution. Furthermore, we chose to not
discuss the concerns that robots may one day be able to claim
some social, cultural, ethical or legal rights, that robots may
become sentient machines [56], which we would not longer
be allowed to enslave [75], or the concern that we may create
robots capable of annihilating mankind [17]. For a discussion
on these issues, we refer the reader to [56], [75], [17].
II. WHO OR WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE WHEN
ROBOTS CAUSE HARM?
Veruggio [100], [102] dates the beginnings of “roboethics”
from two events. One was the Fukuoka World Robot Decla-
ration, wherein it was stated that “next-generation robots will
contribute to the realisation of a safe and peaceful society.”
The other was the Roboethics Roadmap [101], which sought
to promote a cross-cultural discussion among scientists to
monitor the effects of the robotics technologies currently in
use. More recently, an initial sketch of a Code of Ethics for
the robotic community has been proposed [43]. This code
offers general guidelines for ethical behavior. For example,
the code reminds engineers that they may be held responsible
for the actions taken by the artificial creatures that they
helped to design. Along similar lines, Murphy and Woods
[70] propose to rephrase the famous Asimovs Laws, which
they view as robot-centric, in such a way as to remind
robotics researchers and developers of their professional
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 1. Robotic applications of service robots (a,b) and combat robots (c,d): (a) Childcare robot PaPeRo [32], [73]. [Photo courtesy of NEC Corporation.
Unauthorized use not permitted.] (b) Paro therapeutic robot [89]. [Photo courtesy of AIST, Japan] (c) MQ-9 Reaper Hunter/Killer UAV by General Atomics
Aeronautical Systems [33] (d) Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System (MAARS) by Foster-Miller [42].
responsibilities. For example, the first Law was replaced
with: “A human may not deploy a robot without the human-
robot work system meeting the highest legal and professional
standards of safety and ethics” [70, p. 19].
All of the above implicates the responsibility ascription
problem [69]: the problem of assigning responsibility to the
manufacturer, designer, owner, or user of the robot or to the
robot itself when use of a robot leads to a harmful event.
From a philosophical perspective, it is generally agreed
that robots cannot themselves be held morally responsible
[9], [25], [38] (although a few oppose this [95]), because
computers as we conceive them today do not have inten-
tionality [28]. From a psychological perspective, however, it
remains an open question whether people include robots as
an additional agent in the ascription of moral responsibility.
Who or what is responsible when robots cause harm (Fig-
ure 2)? Matthias [62] provides a seemingly simple answer.
He argues that, in most cases, no one can be held accountable
Fig. 2. (a) The responsibility ascription problem, i.e. the problem of
assigning responsibility to either of the manufacturer, designer, owner or
user of the machine when use of this machine led to an armful event is a
yet largely open issue. (b) People may tend to blame the robots, because
they falsely attribute to them moral agency [28]. (c) People blame the
machine, even if they recognize the machine’s lack of free will and lack of
intentionality [30]. (d) Many ethicists argue that we should to some extent
hold the engineers (the creators of the malfunctioning robots) responsible
[60]. (e) In order to do so, we should use existing legal principles, or create
new ones, if necessary [13].
for the robotic failures. For Matthias, the question of who is
in control overcomes the responsibility ascription problem.
Simply put, the greater the autonomy of the system, the
less responsible the human. Further, Matthias reasons that
with the advance of programming techniques (e.g. neural
networks, evolutionary computation) that equip the agent
with the ability to learn and hence to depart from its
original program, it becomes impossible for the programmer
to exhaustively test the behaviors of her creations. In other
words, the programmer can no longer foresee all possible sets
of actions that the robot may take when in function. Hence
the programmer cannot be held responsible if harm should
be done as a secondary effect of the robot interacting with
humans, as long as the robot was not explicitly programmed
to harm people. Matthias suggests that we should broadly
adopt the idea of contracting insurances against harm caused
by robots. Such new type of insurance would ensure that,
when no-one can be held solely responsible for the harm
done, then all the people involved in the incident would share
the costs .
In contrast, Marino and Tamburini [60] state that
Matthias’s claims might have gone too far. In their opinion,
determining who is controlling the robot cannot be a criterion
(albeit even the unique criterion) to ascribe responsibility.
They argue that engineers cannot be freed from all respon-
sibility on the sole ground that they do not have a complete
control over the causal chains implied by the actions of
their robots [60]. They rather offer to use legal principles
that are applied routinely for other purposes, so as to fill
the “responsibility gap” that Matthias emphasized. They
take the example of the legislation in place for ascribing
responsibility to the “legally responsible” person when harm
is done by the “dependent” person. As a result, parents can be
held responsible for the act of their children, when they can
be found to have not provided adequate care or surveillance,
even though there is no clear causal chain connecting them
to the damaging events [60, pp. 49]. A similar solution is
proposed by Asaro [13], who draws a parallel between robots
and any other “completely unremarkable technological arti-
fact[s]” (e.g. a toaster or a car). He shows that the Anglo-
American civil law that rules for damages caused by these
artifacts could also apply to damages produced by robots.
For instance, if a manufacturer was aware of the danger that
robots create, but failed to notify consumers, he may be
charged with failure to warn. And even if the producer
did not know about the danger, he could be accused of
failure to take proper care, meaning that a manufacturer
failed to recognized some easily foreseeable threat brought
upon by his technology.
On the downside, Asaro points out that, while the civil law
can relatively easily be extended to rule for robot use, the
criminal law is hardly applicable to case of criminal actions
caused by robots, as criminal actions can only be performed
by moral agents. A moral agent is deemed so when it
is recognized capable of understanding the moral concepts
conveyed by the bylaws ruling our societies. Without moral
agency, the act of wrongdoing is considered an accident and
not a crime. Furthermore, only a moral agent can be punished
and reformed. This assumes that the moral agent has the
ability to develop and correct its concept of morality [13].
In this context, the responsibility ascription problem is hence
reduced to the issue of attributing moral agency to the robot.
Several authors have approached the problem of ascribing
moral agency to robots. Solumn [91]. For instance, Harnard
proposes to use some sort of “moral” Turing tests to establish
whether the robot can be held responsible in court [37].
Another issue around the responsibility ascription problem
centers on attributing moral agency to a robot. In one
study, Friedman and Millett [30] found that 83% of the
undergraduate computer science majors they interviewed
attributed aspects of agency - either decision-making and/or
intentions - to computers. In addition, 21% of these students
consistently held computers morally responsible for error. In
another paper, Friedman and Kahn [28] identified a situation
that may increase peoples attribution of agency to a machine:
namely, when the machine is an expert recommendation
system. Friedman and Kahn provide an example of the acute
physiology and chronic health evaluation (APACHE) system
[21]: a sophisticated computer-based modeling recommen-
dation system to help hospital staff determine when to end
life-support for patients in intensive care units. Friedman
and Kahn argue that the more such a system is relied
on for objective and authoritative information, the more
difficult it becomes to override its recommendations, and
the more likely staff, including physicians, could begin to
attribute moral agency toward the system. As a potential
solution to such problems, Friedman and Kahn offer two
design strategies. First, computational systems should be
designed in ways that do not denigrate the human user to
machine-like status. Second, computational systems should
be designed in ways that do not impersonate human agency
by attempting to mimic intentional states. The problem,
however, in applying this second recommendation to robot
design and implementation, especially those robots that have
a humanoid form, is that such robots by design are conveying
human attributes, and thus fostering this very problem.
III. ETHICAL ISSUES IN SERVICE ROBOTS
The design principle mentioned in the previous section
aims at ensuring that robotic systems remain easily distin-
guishable from humans. Accordingly, this principle should
help people ascribe responsibility in cases when the machine
malfunctions or harms someone. However, as we noted, the
current trend in robotics is the opposite, as there is a growing
effort to design robots so that they look like humans [44],
[45] or animals [31], [89].
The idea of designing machine masquerading humans was
questioned by Miller on the ground of human freedom[67].
Miller argues that, if human-like robots really came to share
human space on a daily basis, humans should be allowed
to decide whether they wished or not to interact with these
creatures; and if they should decide they wanted to interact
solely with other humans, they should be given the freedom
to do so. Similarly, efforts at endowing robots with social
skills have been criticized on the ground that the number
of meaningful social interactions that humans are typically
capable to maintain is relatively small [23], [47]. Therefore,
interacting with social artificial agents on a regular basis
may lead people to become less prone to engage in social
interactions with other people [66]. Others have suggested
that people will likely form psychological intimacy with
robots of the future, though of an impoverished form [50].
To shed some light on the above debate, researches have
begun to investigate the type of human-robot relationships
that arise when people interact with robotic systems that
mimic human or animal’ behavior. In a series of four
studies, for example, Kahn and his colleagues investigated
children’s social and moral relationships with the robot dog,
the Artificial Intelligence roBOt (AIBO). The first three
studies compared children’s interaction with and reasoning
about AIBO to, respectively, a stuffed (non-robotic) dog [49],
a biologically live dog [65] and a mechanical non-robot dog
[94], whereas the fourth study analyzed postings in AIBO
online discussion forums that spoke of members relationships
with their AIBO [29]. Together, these four studies provide
converging evidence that children and adults can and often
do establish meaningful and robust social conceptualizations
of and relationships with a robot that they recognize as a
technology. For example, in the online discussion forum
study, members affirmed that AIBO was a technology (75%),
life-like (48%), had mental states (60%), and was a social
being (59%).
Across these four studies, however, the researchers found
inconsistent findings in terms of people’s commitments to
AIBO as a moral agent. In the online discussion forum study,
for example, only 12% of the postings affirmed that AIBO
had moral standing, including that AIBO had rights, merited
respect, engendered moral regard, could be a recipient of
care, or could be held morally responsible or blameworthy
[29]. In contrast, in the Melson et al. study [65] it was
found that while on the one hand the children granted greater
moral standing to a biologically live dog (86%) than to AIBO
(76%), it was still striking that such a large percentage of
children (76%) granted moral standing to the robot dog at
all. One explanation for these inconsistent findings between
studies is that the measures for establishing moral standing
have been few, and themselves difficult to interpret. For
example, two of the five moral questions in the Melson
et al. study were: “If you decided you did not like AIBO
anymore is it OK or not OK to throw AIBO in the garbage?”
or “If you decided you did not like AIBO anymore is it
OK or not OK to destroy AIBO?”. The “Not OK” answers
were interpreted as indicating moral standing. But plausibly
one could make the same judgment about throwing away or
destroying an expensive computer (because, e.g., it would
wasteful) without committing morally to the artifact [65].
Since humans can develop emotional attachment toward
robots, concerns have been expressed regarding the long-
term consequences that such attachment may have on the
individual. This is especially relevant when the person is
fragile, as it is the case with children and people with mental
delays. However, there are also several reasons to believe
that interacting with social robots may benefit some of these
individuals [48], [54], [97]. For instance, interacting with
robots that display social behavior may help children with
autism acquire social skills [80], [26]. Robins et al. [80]
conducted studies following children with autism interacting
with a humanoid robot over the course of several weeks.
Unknown to the children, the robot was puppeteered, so that
it imitated the children’s movement. Robins et al. showed
that repeated exposure to the robot facilitated the emergence
of spontaneous, proactive and playful behavior, which these
children very rarely display. Furthermore, once accustomed
to the robot, the children seemed to engage in more proactive
interactive behavior with the adult investigator present in
the room during the experiment. This leads, in some cases,
to a triadic interaction between child, robot and adult. For
example, children would acknowledge the presence of the
investigator by spontaneously sitting on his lap for a few
moments, holding his hand, or even trying to communicate
by using simple words. However, it was not clear whether
the social skills that children exhibited during the interactions
with the robot had lasting effects.
In another study, Feil-Seifer and Mataric´ used a bubble-
blowing robot in a triadic interaction of child-caretaker-
robot. While the robot was not actually behaving socially,
its automatic bubble-blowing behavior provoked more child-
caretaker interactions. In a similar triadic child-parent-robot
scenario, Kozima and colleagues conducted a series of stud-
ies using Keepon, a simple two-link robot-ball-face, whose
motions conveyed emotional expressions. These studies sup-
ported Robins et al.’s findings that children with autism, in
such triadic scenario, spontaneously displayed sociality and
affect which they otherwise tend to avoid [55], [26]. In turn,
Stanton and Kahn conducted a comparative study of children
with autism interacting with AIBO as opposed to a simpler
mechanical toy dog [94]. Results showed that, in comparison
to the toy dog, the children spoke more words to AIBO,
and more often engaged in three types of behavior with
AIBO typical of children without autism: verbal engagement,
reciprocal interaction, and authentic interaction. In addition,
there was highly suggestive evidence that the children, while
in the AIBO session, engaged in fewer autistic behaviors. A
survey of these studies can be found in [79].
As a whole, these studies seem to indicate that playing
with robots that appear to behave in an autonomous and
social manner may help children with autism display more
of these social skills that autism therapy seeks to promote.
Such a robotic aided therapy does not aim at developing
attachment of the children towards the robot, but it might
be a potential side-effect. The question remains if it is
ethically correct to encourage children with autism to engage
in affective interactions with machines incapable of emo-
tions. Dautenhahn’s and Werry’s response is that, “from the
perspective of a person with autism, and her needs, are these
ethical concerns really relevant?” [24, pp. 35].
Similarly, robotic pets used in therapy with the elderly may
offer some level of companionship. The seal robot, Paro, is
probably the best example of such an application [89] (Figure
1.(b)). Wada et al. [104] report on extended use of Paro as
part of therapeutic sessions in pediatric wards and elderly
institutions world-wide. Results showed that interaction with
Paro improved the patients’ and elderly people’s moods
and reduced their stress level [103]. It made them more
active and communicative both among themselves and with
their caretakers. A pilot study using electroencephalography
(EEG) suggested that this robot therapy may improve pattern
of brain activity in patients suffering from dementia [104].
Furthermore, the effects of long-term interaction between
Paro and the elderly was found to last for more than a year
[105].
While the above results speak in favor of using robots
for therapy with the elderly, Sharkey offers a more cautious
argumentation [85]. In his opinion such surrogate compan-
ions do not really alleviate the elderly’s isolation and people
are deluded about the real nature of their relationship to the
devices [92] (Figure 3). Furthermore, even the robots that
are clearly helping the elderly to maintain independence in
their own homes [27] (e.g. robots used to remind the patient
to take her medication), could lead to a situation where
the elderly is left exclusively to the care of machines, and
deprived of the benefits of human contact, which is often
provided by caregivers [93]).
Robot-nannies are another example of robotics applica-
tions that raise ethical questions [88]. There is an effort,
mainly in South Korea and Japan, to build more sophisticated
robots that could not only monitor babies (as e.g. Personal
Partner Robot by NEC [32], Figure 1.(a)) but that would
also be equipped with enough autonomy so as to call upon
human caretakers only in unusual circumstances. It is likely
that children will spend time playing with childcare robots, as
researchers progress in designing ways for the robot to offer
Fig. 3. Interacting with robots that display social behavior may help
children with autism-acquired social skills. The question remains whether it
is ethically correct to encourage children with autism to engage in affective
interactions with machines incapable of emotions. But, from the perspective
of a person with autism, and her needs, are these ethical concerns really
relevant? [24, pp. 35]. In a broader context, some believe that, the surrogate
companions (e.g. robots assisting the elderly) are becoming more common,
because people are deluded about the real nature of their relationship
to the devices [95]. (Photo courtesy of KASPAR robot by University of
Hertfordshire [108]
sustained interactions with the child that may span months
or even years [51], [63], [88]. The results, however, may be
detrimental to the physical and mental development of the
child if children were to be left without human contact for
many hours per day [85]. This remains very speculative as
the psychological impact that such robotics care may have
on children’ development is unknown. Some of the literature
has attempted to draw parallels with reports on severe social
disfunctions in young monkeys who interacted solely with
artificial caretakers throughout the first years of development
[61], [16], [88]. Perhaps of more pressing concern is the fact
that there is no regulation to specifically deal with the case of
child abuse when the child is cared for by a robot (national
and international laws protecting children from mistreatment
such as The United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Child [71] do not cover this case) [88]. While one may argue
that, when the time will really come to see robots caring
for children, one will work on the associated legal issues,
some people counter that this may be a bigger challenge than
expected, as providing a unified code of ethics for regulating
the use of robot-nannies may be impossible due to cultural
differences between nations [36].
IV. ETHICAL ISSUES IN LETHAL ROBOTS
In Section III, we covered some of the ethical issues
that stem from current or foreseen robotic applications of
service robots for education and therapy. Of equal if not
more immediate ethical concern are the current military
applications of robots. Even though fully autonomous robots
are not yet running in battlefields, the risks and benefits that
introducing such autonomous lethal machine may have on
wars are of crucial importance. Furthermore, because mili-
tary technology often finds its way into civilian applications,
such as security or policing [14], [87], ethical issues related
to military robots impacts society on even broader level.
Currently, the decision to use a robotic device to kill
human beings still lies with a human operator. This decision
stems not out of any technical necessity, but from the desire
to make sure that the human remains “in the loop” [14].
It is clear that the margin that separates us from having
fully autonomous armed systems in the battlefield is thinning.
Even if all armed robots were to be supervised by humans,
one may still wonder to what extent the human is still in
control [9]. Moreover, there may be cases where one cannot
avoid giving full autonomy to the system. For instance,
combat aircrafts must be fully autonomous in order to
effectively operate [99]. Sharkey predicts that, as the number
of robots in operation in the battlefield increases, the robots
may outnumber human soldiers. He then argues that it will
become impossible for humans to simultaneously operate all
these robots. Robots will then have to be fully autonomous
[83].
One ethical issue (perhaps the issue that received most
attention to date) arising from increasing autonomy of war
robots has to do with the problem of discriminating between
enemy combatants and innocent people. This distinction is at
the core of the “just war theory” [106] and the humanitarian
laws [82]. These laws stipulate that only enemy combatants
are legitimate targets and prohibit attacks against any other
non-legitimate targets [84], [14]. Sharkey argues rightfully
that our robots are still far from having visual capabilities that
may allow to discriminate faithfully between legitimate and
non-legitimate targets, even in close-contact encounter [85]
(Figure 4). In addition, distinguishing between legitimate and
illegitimate targets is not purely a technical issue and is
further complicated by the lack of a clear definition of what a
counts as a civilian1. But even if one was provided with a pre-
cise definition that could be encoded in a computer program,
it is doubtful that robots would achieve, in the foreseeable
future, a level of complexity in robot cognition that would
allow the robot to recognize ambiguous situations involving
a non-legitimate target manipulating lethal instruments (such
as, for example, a situation where a child is carrying guns or
ammunition). Sharkey argues that autonomous lethal systems
should not be used until one can fully demonstrate that the
systems can faithfully distinguish between a soldier and a
civilian in all situations [83]. Others, however, argue that this
1The 1944 Geneva Convention advises to use common sense and the
1977 Protocol 1 defines a civilian as any person who is not a fighter. [72]
condition is too stringent, since even humans make errors
of this kind [58] (Figure 4). Arkin, counters that, although
unmanned robotic systems may make mistakes, it would on
average behave more ethically than human beings [9]. In
support, Arkin cites a report from the Surgeon General’s
Office [96] regarding the ethics of soldiers. Less than half of
the soldiers believed that non-fighters should be treated with
dignity. The other half was unclear as to how they should be
treated. Moreover, one tenth of the soldiers had mistreated
civilians and one third reported having at least once faced
a situation where they felt incapable of deciding from an
ethical stance the correct action (although all had received
ethical training). Arkin argues that since human soldiers
appear to misbehave from time to time, using machines
that are more reliable and hence would, on average, make
less mistakes, should bring more good than harm. Lin and
colleagues share the view that human soldiers are indeed
less reliable and report on evidence that human soldiers may
act irrationally when in fear or stressed. They hence concur
that combat robots, that are affected neither by fear or stress,
may act more ethically than human soldiers irrespective of
the circumstances [58].
Lin and colleagues point to one more issue related to using
combat robots. As in the case of any other new computational
technology, errors and bugs will inevitably exist and these
will lead combat robots to cause harmful accidents [58].
Such bugs or errors will be far more costly as human lives
might be at stake. They advise extensive testing of each
military robot prior to usage. Nevertheless, they anticipate
that, due to they their high complexity, these robots will
still occasionally make errors and kill innocent people [58].
Such errors could even lead to accidental wars, if the robot’s
unexpected aggressive behavior was to be interpreted by the
opponent as an act of war [14]. Groups of people interested
in starting a war may seize upon such accidents to justify
hostilities.
Even if one is not disputing the ethical question of entering
in war, one may want to question the ethics of having armed
robots fully autonomous and used routinely in battlefields,
especially when only one side may have robots. Politicians
may favor efforts to replace human fighters with robots, as
each country feels a moral obligation to protect the lives of its
soldiers [83]. However, there may be long-term consequences
of waging these so-called risk-free wars2 or push-button
wars3. Since such wars will return wrecked metal in place
of dead bodies (at least to the country using only robots),
the emotional impact that wars currently have on civilians
of that country will be largely lessened. The above is true
only for the civilians not affected directly by combat, i.e. for
wars fought in a distance.
It is feared that this may make it easier for a country to
launch a war. These wars may also last for longer periods of
time [58]. There are contradicting opinions whether this may
2A war where pilotless aircraft can beat a country’s forces before sending
in the ground robots to clean up” [83, p. 16]
3A war in which the enemy is killed at a distance, without any immediate
risk to oneself [14, pp. 62]
Fig. 4. (a) Noel Sharkey argues that the cognitive capabilities of robots do
not match that of humans, and thus lethal robots are unethical, as they may
make mistakes more easily than humans [85]. (b) Ronald Arkin believes
that although an unmanned system will not be able to perfectly behave
in battlefield, it can perform more ethically that human beings [9]. (c)
In part, the question about the morality of using robots in the battlefield
involves commitments on the capability of artificial intelligence. (Photo of
the soldier’s silhouette by Ruminglass and Quibik, under CC BY-SA 3.0)
result in people growing indifferent to the conduct of war.
Sharkey fears that this would be the case [83], whereas Asaro
believes that people are nearly always averse to starting an
unjust war, irrespective of whether or not it would lead to
human fatalities [14, pp. 58]. The fact that the war is risk-
free does not by itself make it more acceptable [14]. Lin and
colleagues counterweight this line of reasoning, arguing that
such reasoning may lead to even more “dangerously foolish”
ideas, such as the idea of trying to prevent wars to happen
by increasing the brutality of the fighting [58].
It was also argued that risk-free wars might increase
terrorism, as the only possibility to strike back at a country
who uses mainly robots in wars is to attack its citizens
[83]. The less advanced, “technologically speaking”, side
may advocate terrorism as a morally acceptable means to
counterattack, on the ground that “robot armies” are the
product of a rich and elaborate economy, and that members
of that economy are the next-best legitimate targets [14, pp.
64]. Hence, risk-free wars may paradoxically increase the
risk for civilians [46]. However, Asaro reminds us that wars
are deemed morally acceptable as long as they do not harm
civilians[14]. According to this definition, terrorism would
not be justified, irrespective of whether it is meant as a
response to a country using robot armies. Thus, the fear
that terrorism may increase as a result of using robot armies
does not constitute, in Asaro’s view, a valid moral objection
to using robot armies. Only the questions of whether robot
armies cause more harm or a greater injustice (than using a
human army) are of essence in the debate [14].
In contrast, Arkin anticipates that we will not end-up with
armies of unmanned systems operating on their own, but
that rather heterogeneous teams composed of autonomous
systems and humans soldiers will work together on the
battlefield. Wars would hence not be fully risk-free and
so the dreaded consequences in increased terrorism or in
societal indifference are not to be feared. Furthermore, Arkin
expects that mixed teams, composed of robots and human
soldiers, will act more ethically than any group composed
of solely human soldiers. One reason is that robots equipped
with video cameras (or other sensors) will record and report
actions on the battlefield. Thus, they might serve as a
deterrent against unethical behavior, as such acts would be
registered. However, Lin and colleagues argue that if soldiers
were to know that they are being watched by their fellow
robot soldiers, they may no longer trust them and this could
impact team cohesion and armed effectiveness [58].
In terms of law, Sharkey points out that the legal status of
war robots is unclear [86]. For example, while the unmanned
aerial vehicle RQ-1 Predator (Figure 1.(d)) was developed
as a reconnaissance machine (hence the R in the name),
it was subsequently equipped with Hellfire missiles and
renamed MQ-1 (where M stands for multipurpose). The
MQ-1 was never approved as a weapon; however, it did
not need to be. The reason is as follows. Because the bare
RQ-1 was not considered a weapon (since it was meant
for surveillance only) and the hellfire missiles have already
been approved separately as weapons, the combination did
not need special approval [19]. Such reasoning may create
a precedent whereby armed robots with growing level of
autonomy can be created and used little legal control. Asaro
notices that “what is and what is not acceptable in war” is
ultimately the subject of convention between nations [14, pp.
64]. He argues that we can find support in existing laws only
to a certain extent. Eventually, the international community
will be forced to create new laws and treaties in order to
regulate the use of autonomous fighting robots.
V. MACHINE ETHICS
Although still in its early stages, machine ethics offers
a practical approach to introduce ethics in the design of
autonomous machines. Machine ethics aims at giving the ma-
chine some autonomy, while ensuring that its behavior will
abide ethical rules. Primarily, machine ethics seeks methods
to ensure that the machines’s behavior toward humans is
proper [4], but it also may extend to designing rules driving
ethical behavior of a machine toward another machine [6].
Machine ethics extends the field of computer ethics that is
concerned with how people behave with their computers to
address the problem of how machine behave in general [2].
The interest in machine ethics is driven by the fact
that robots have been already tightly integrated into hu-
man societies. Thus, since the robots already interact with
humans and, as argued in Section II, engineers could be
held responsible (to certain extent) for the actions of their
creations, it is desirable to find methods of equipping the
machines with moral behavior. Importantly, although the
public attention might be focusing on the military application
(such as Arkin’s military advisor providing guidance on the
use of lethal force by a robot [11]), machine ethics seems
to be more concerned with service robots. The examples of
such applications are many. Robots that share the workbench
with humans in the industry might no longer be considered
just a manufacturing tool, but also a “colleague” with whom
workers interact [20]. Artificial sales-agents in e-commerce,
which can predict customers behaviors, should not abuse this
knowledge by displaying unethical behavior [39]. Driverless
trains in extreme situations might be forced to make deci-
sions that could have life or death implications [2].
Asimov’s Laws of Robotics are one of the first and best
known proposal to embed ethical concepts in the controller
of the robot4. According to these, all robots should under all
circumstances obey three laws:
1) A robot may not injure a human being or, through
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
2) A robot must obey orders it receives from human
beings, except when such orders conflict with the first
law.
3) A robot must protect its own existence as long as such
protection does not conflict with the first or second
laws.
Later, Asimov added the 4th Law (known as the Law
Zero)
4) No robot may harm humanity or, through inaction,
allow humanity to come to harm.
Many researchers recognize that the Asimov’s laws as-
sumes that robots have sufficient cognition to make moral
decisions in all situations, including the complicated ones, in
which even humans might have doubts [70]. Consequently,
keeping in mind the current level of AI, these laws, although
simple and elegant, serve no useful practical purpose [9]
and are thus viewed as an unsatisfactory basis for machine
ethics [8], [34]. Nevertheless, Asimov’s laws often serve as
a reference or starting point in the discussions related to
machine ethics.
Fedaghi [1] proposes a classification scheme of ethical cat-
egories to simplify the process by which a robot may deter-
mine which action is most ethical in complicated situations.
As a proof of concept, Fedaghi applies this classification to
decompose Asimov’s laws, showing hereby that these laws,
once rephrased, can support logical reasoning. Such an ap-
proach is in-line with so-called procedural ethics [59], which
develops procedures to guide the process by which ethical
decisions are made [1]. A similar approach is presented in
[18] that draws inspiration in Leibniz’s dream of a universal
moral calculus [57]. There, deontic logic [22], [68] (i.e. logic
extended with special operators for representing ethical con-
cepts) is used instead of Asimov’s laws to ground the robot’s
4The Asimov’s Law of Robotics were first introduced in the short science-
fiction story Runaround [15]
ethical reasoning. Such a methodology aims at maximizing
the likelihood that a robot will behave in a certifiably ethical
fashion. That is, the robot’s actions will be determined so that
the ethical correctness of the resulting robot’s behavior can
be ensured through formal proofs. Such formal proofs check
if a given robot (a) only takes permissible actions and (b)
performs all obligatory actions (subject to ties and conflicts)
[12]. Promoters of such methodology reason that human
relationships and, by extension human-robot relationships,
need to be based on some level of trust [107]. Such a formal
and logical approach to describing robot behavior may help
to determine whether the system is trustworthy or not. In
contrast, they view inductive reasoning, that is based on case
studies, as unreliable, because, while the “premise (success
on trials) may all be true, the conclusion (desired behavior
in the future) might still be false” [18], [90].
Others oppose this point of view and advocate the use of
case-based reasoning (CBR) [74]. They reason that people
can behave ethically without learning ethics (drawing a
parallel to the fact that one can speak fluently a language
without having received any formal grammar lessons) [81].
For example, McLaren implemented a CBR ethical reasoner
[64] and Anderson created a machine learning system that
automatically derives rules (principles) from cases provided
by an expert ethicist [3], [7], [5]. For example, Arkin uses de-
liberative/reactive autonomous robotic architectures and pro-
vides the theory and formalisms for ethical control [10] and
applies these to automatic military advisor [11]. He considers
stimuli to behavior mappings and extends them with ethical
constraints in order to ensure appropriate robot response
(consistent with law). In the another example, Honarvar [40]
used a CBR-like mechanism to train an artificial neural
network (ANN) to classify what is morally acceptable in a
beliefe-desire-intention (BDI) framework [77]. He used this
framework to augment the ethical knowledge of sales-agent
in an e-commerce application [39].
A particular machine ethics system that is comparatively
easy to implement is one based on utilitarianism. It uses
a mathematical calculus to determine the best choice (by
computing and maximizing the “goodness”, however defined,
of all actions) [4]. But, while utilitarianism values benefits
brought upon society as a whole, it does not protect the
fundamental rights of each individual [78], [11] and thus is
of limited interest [35]. Still, practical work with a certain
utilitarian flavor can be found in the literature, as most CBR
systems presented previously assume that an arithmetic value
is the main basis for determining what it is moral to do [53].
The last approach we will mention is the rule-based one
proposed by Powers [76]. Powers argues that ethical systems
such as Kant’s categorical imperative5 lead naturally to a set
of rules. This approach hence assumes that an ideological
ethical code can be translated into a set of core rules.
This is somewhat similar to the deontic logic we reviewed
5A categorical imperative denotes an absolute, unconditional requirement
that asserts its authority in all circumstances, e.g. “Act only according to
that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law” [52, pp.30].
earlier on. It allows robots to logically derive new ethical
rules, appropriate to particular and new situations. Although
interesting, this approach has not gathered much attention,
as researchers usually turn to pure logic systems or case-
based reasoning. Also, Powers’ ethical system had been
criticized by Tonkens [98] on the basis that the development
of Kantian artificial agents is itself against Kant’s ethics.
According to Kant, moral agents are both rational and free,
whereas machines can only be rational. Hence, the mere fact
of implementing a sense of morality into machines limits the
machine’s freedom of thought and reasoning.
In brief, machine ethics is composed of a number of
interesting attempts to embed ethical rules in the robot’s
controller. These rules may be common or popular in society,
such as Asimov’s laws, or they may be derived from classical
philosophical approaches, such as utilitarianism or Kantian
ethics. Logical reasoning is the driving framework for most
approaches. While still in infancy, machine ethics is a
valuable attempt to provide robots with ethical behavior. But
the approach may fall prey to several problems discussed
throughout this paper. Three of them stand out. One, if
machines are not capable of being moral agents, as most
philosophers agree, then it seems suspect to design into
them the ability to make moral decisions. Second, equipping
the machines with morality (assuming it is possible), does
not need to be a moral act on its own and might depend
on the application one has in mind while developing a
moral robot. For example, embedding morality into robo-
nannies or combat robots could lead to the widespread use
of them, which could have severe negative consequences on
the society (see Section III and Section IV). Finally, in an
attempt to embed ethics into machines, due to their limited
cognition, one must often unduly simplify the moral life.
This seems to stand against the very goal of machine ethics
itself (at least to some extent). It seems it is still too early
to judge if the methods of machine ethics will prove useful
or not, and awaits more applications implemented in life.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Almost everyone agrees that they want robots to contribute
to a better world, and a more ethical one. The disagreements
arise in how to bring that about. Some people want to
embed ethical rules in the robots controller, and employ
such robots in morally challenging contexts, as on the
battlefield. Others argue vehemently against this approach:
that robots themselves are incapable of being moral agents
and thus should not be designed to have moral-decision
making abilities. Others want to leverage the social aspects
of robotics in bringing about human good. Along these lines,
researchers have explored how robots can help children with
autism, or assist the elderly physically and thereby provide
the elderly with enough autonomy to allow them to live in
their own residences. Other researchers have explored how
robots can provide companionship for the elderly, and for the
general population. Still others have worried that no matter
how sophisticated robots become in their form and function,
their technological platform will always separate people from
them, and prevent depth and authenticity of relation from
forming.
These are all open questions. Some are philosophical in
nature, as is the question of whether robots are moral agents,
or could be in the future. Some are psychological, as in the
question of whether people attribute moral responsibility to
robots that cause harm. Some require political answers and
new legislation. And, finally, some - if not many - of the
questions require thoughtful and on-going responses by those
of us who are the engineers and designers of the robots.
The engineer is no longer entirely free of responsibility
regarding the ethical consequences of his/her creation. This
seems at odds with the way research is currently done in
robotics. Rarely does one question the long-term ethical
consequences of the research reported upon in scientific
publications6. There are several reasons for this. On the one
hand, most of these damaging long-term consequences seem
very speculative and still far away from the technological
reality. On the other hand, it is expected that these issues will
be disputed at a political level and hence that it is perhaps
not the role of the engineers and scientists to discuss these.
Some scientists however discuss these issues, but, as with
any debate, people have sometimes opposite views on which
robotic application is ethical and which is not. We showed
that such dissensions stemmed often from different beliefs on
human nature and different expectations on what technology
may achieve in the future. While it is difficult to anticipate
how and when robots will come to play an active role in
our society, there is no reason why one should not continue
discussing various scenarios. We might be motivated by the
beauty of our artifacts. Or by their usefulness. Or by the eco-
nomic rewards. But in addition we are morally accountable
for what we design and put out into the world.
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